India’s Climate Diplomacy at a Crossroads
By Dhanasree Jayaram
When China announced its target of achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2060, all eyes shifted to the other major emerging economies - particularly India - to follow suit. The Indian Government is still mulling over whether to declare such a target in the run up to the 2021 United Nations (UN) climate change conference in Glasgow, COP26. While there is external pressure on India to declare a 2050 net zero emissions goal and domestically favourable voices (including from the ruling party), the counter-arguments are strong, considering the ripple effects on the coal-dependent economy, development imperatives, jobs, and equity. However, in light of gradual shifts in India’s climate diplomacy positions that have placed it among the ‘progressives’ club, it would not be a surprise if the administration chooses to adopt a target, provided external financial and technological support is guaranteed by the developed countries. This precondition is explicitly mentioned in India’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) too, which has consistently emphasised meaningful and equitable climate action.
What is clear is that from a mere preoccupation with ethical ideas of historical responsibility, equity, and climate justice as well as development, India’s climate diplomacy positions have evolved to assume far greater relevance for its geopolitical and foreign policy strategy. India is willing to cooperate at all levels, and forge institutions such as the International Solar Alliance (ISA), but has also neglected its own ecological and socio-economic vulnerabilities and requirements. The country’s adaptation planning is languishing due to the lack of resources, poor institutional coordination, and indiscriminate development planning. Another challenging area of action is ‘just transition’, as the country begins to focus on post-COVID-19 green recovery. Furthermore, with the growing backlash against the official stifling of the voices of climate activists, the administration’s climate diplomacy gains could be eroded.
Climate Diplomacy and Major Emerging Economies
In my book, Climate Diplomacy and Emerging Economies: India as a Case Study, I explore the role of the emerging economies – the BASIC countries of Brazil, South Africa, India, and China – in the international climate order. With their similar positions on issues such as historical responsibility of the developed countries, Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), sovereignty (on issues such as Measuring, Reporting and Verification), transfer of finances and technology (from the developed to developing countries), equitable sharing of carbon and development space, and so on, these countries positioned themselves as a unified group for a long time (and continue to do so, albeit with lesser vigour today). Despite their growing greenhouse emissions they opposed the adoption of legally binding targets and have criticised industrialised countries for reneging on their commitments (including on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol). For this reason, they have also been criticised by the developed and least developing countries for delaying climate action.
As much as they draw strength from their ‘solidarity’, there are clear divisions, including on the operationalisation of equity. For instance, from an Indian perspective, decoupling from China has become a priority in all spheres, including the climate one, owing to geopolitical/geoeconomic shifts (India-China border tensions, strengthening of QUAD, diversification of supply chains, etc.).
It is also important to highlight the gradually changed/changing domestic scenario (on climate policy) in these countries over the past decade or so, as it impinges upon their climate diplomacy. This is most discernible in the way in which they have developed a national consensus on issues related to climate change, and accordingly built capacities (such as in knowledge production), policies (at various levels of governance), and institutions among others. In a country such as India, as time progressed, climate action has become a part of its national interest – an agenda that could promote India’s socio-economic development (as an opportunity to attain co-benefits for both climate change and development), and strengthen India’s position internationally as a ‘responsible power’ and potential ‘climate leader’, ready to assume greater responsibility on issues of global governance.
What is equally important to emphasise is the growing number of bilateral, multilateral, informal, and other forms of arrangements that strive to fill the lacunae in UN-led global climate governance. The period 2015-2019, was critical, in light of the Trump administration’s disavowal of the Paris Agreement. With this development in particular, countries such as China and India launched themselves further to live up to their reputation of a ‘responsible power’, hinged on multilateralism and the rule of law.
India’s Climate Diplomacy after 2020
As the Glasgow Summit nears, India’s focus will continue to be on clean energy goals. Recently, while accepting the CERAWeek Global Energy and Environment Leadership Award, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reiterated India’s commitment to achieving clean energy goals as a part of its climate action strategy. He reiterated the government’s narrative that intertwines climate and energy goals (‘co-benefits’), emphasises sustainable development (interlinking climate goals with Sustainable Development Goals as a potential marketing strategy), calls for “behavioural change” worldwide (a change in worldview), and could reignite the spirit of India’s “traditional habits” (rooted in cultural ideals).
On the domestic front, India has a long way to go in terms of developing a robust climate action strategy, despite a progressive rhetorical renaissance in the international arena – from a ‘naysayer’ to a ‘responsible’ player.
The government has appointed a high-level inter-ministerial Apex Committee for Implementation of Paris Agreement(AIPA). This is a significant move as the country attempts to restructure several sectors for a smooth energy transition. Lately, its coal problem has come under the scanner, especially after the UN Secretary-General António Guterres urged the Indian government to phase out coal - not merely for climate mitigation purposes but to tackle worsening air pollution levels in the country (reflecting India’s co-benefits approach to climate action). According to a recent report, air pollution was responsible for the death of nearly 1.7 million people in India, and a loss of 1.4 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2019.
The message has not been received well by the domestic audience, for whom international equity and just transition (for those heavily dependent on the coal industry) cannot be compromised. Nevertheless, India’s just transition strategy is in the making; and it will need to address significant financial, political, institutional, social, and infrastructural loopholes in the energy sector. The coal sector remains crucial for India’s energy security goals, even though the percentage of its contribution to the country’s electricity generation is slowly decreasing. While the coal mining sector accounts for less than 1 percent of the labour market some of the poorest states in the country are heavily dependent on it, and will have to diversify their economies. The electricity sector requires reforms too, given that institutions such as distribution companies have been plagued by financial and structural risks. When it comes to energy transition, one cannot leave out the issue of land acquisition for renewable energy projects, which has run into severe hurdles in many parts of India as conflicts between the authorities and people (most affected being the marginalised communities) grow.
On the domestic front, India has a long way to go in terms of developing a robust climate action strategy, despite a progressive rhetorical renaissance in the international arena – from a ‘naysayer’ to a ‘responsible’ player. There is an urgent need for a transformational shift in development planning – with greater resources for adaptation to extreme weather events, water scarcity, and other concerns that have massive social and economic implications. Furthermore, the present government, despite being conscious of its international reputation, has turned a blind eye to the suppression of climate activism by law enforcement authorities. Just as it has been able to build a place for itself on the global climate high-table by contributing several ideas (and institutions), such as that of a solar alliance, and a coalition for disaster resilient infrastructure, the government needs to step up its climate diplomacy to achieve the desired results domestically – by involving all the stakeholders, including the youth of the country.
Dr. Dhanasree Jayaram is an Assistant Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, and Co-coordinator, Centre for Climate Studies, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Karnataka, India. The views expressed in this article are her personal views.
This article is original content published under a Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
